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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Court of Appeals adopts elevated standard in determining prob-
able cause for alleged obscenity violations
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution'
provides protection against unreasonable search and seizure in the
absence of probable cause.2 State constitutions are constrained to
' U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Id.
The essence of the fourth amendment was explained by Justice Brandeis:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to
the pursuit of happiness. . . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs,
their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The fourth amendment expresses the determination of the drafters of the Bill of
Rights, who vividly remembered the "general warrants known as writs of assistance under
which officers of the Crown had so bedeviled the colonists." Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,
481 (1964). These writs gave customs officers the authority to search anywhere for goods
imported in violation of British tax laws. See id. They were denounced as "'the worst in-
strument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty...' because they placed
'the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.'" Id. (quoting James Otis). The
Bill of Rights acknowledged that the "unrestricted power of search and seizure could also be
an instrument for stifling liberty of expression." Marcus v. Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717,
729 (1961).
The courts have adopted the philosophy that general warrants should be rejected in
this country as they were in England. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622
(1886) (compulsory production of private books and papers violates fourth amendment).
The Court in Boyd asserted that those who had framed the fourth amendment were un-
doubtedly familiar with England's rejection of general warrants. See id. at 626-27. See also
F. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476-1776 (1965) (history of search and
seizure in England).
2 See W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.1, at 437 (1978). Under the fourth amend-
ment, no arrest or search may stand in the absence of probable cause. See id. § 3.2, at 495.
Neither Congress nor law enforcement officers are free to compromise the fourth amend-
ment. See id. The "doctrine is based in part upon the need to guard against arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement .. " Id. at 497. The finding of probable cause may rest upon
evidence which is inadmissible in a criminal trial. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307,
311 (1959). The evidence required need not establish guilt. See Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 102 (1959) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). Probable cause exists when an officer, acting prudently, exam-
ines the facts and circumstances and believes that an offense has been committed. See
Henry, 361 U.S. at 102; United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 592 (1948); Director Gen. v.
Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923); Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878). Probable
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provide at least the same minimum levels of protection against
such unjustified invasions of privacy as are provided under the fed-
eral Constitution.3 In our system of federalism, however, the states
are permitted to extend greater protection of rights and liberties to
their citizens under their own state constitutions.4 New York has
cause generally "means less than evidence which would justify condemnation." Locke v.
United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813).
New York courts have defined probable cause in the same manner. See People v. Bige-
low, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 488 N.E.2d 451, 455, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 634 (1985); People v. Han-
Ion, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 559, 330 N.E.2d 631, 637, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677, 684-85 (1975); People v.
Marshall, 13 N.Y.2d 28, 34, 191 N.E.2d 798, 801, 241 N.Y.S.2d 417, 421 (1963). The function
of probable cause is to guarantee a high probability that any invasion involved in the search
can be justified by the discovery of the claimed items. See generally Comment, Search and
Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHL L. REV. 664,
687-992 (1961) (discussion of fourth amendment protections).
Another protection afforded by probable cause is the requirement that the search war-
rant be reviewed by a neutral and detached magistrate. See W. LAFAvE, supra, § 3.1, at 447-
48. The protection further requires that any inferences be judged by an independent body.
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); see also Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (magistrate and not police must perform detached function);
United States v. Ventressa, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965) (same). New York courts follow the
same approach. See Monserrate v. Upper Court St. Book Store, 49 N.Y.2d 306, 309, 401
N.E.2d 414, 415-16, 425 N.Y.S.2d 304, 306 (1980) (quoting People v. Potwora, 48 N.Y.2d 91,
95, 397 N.E.2d 361, 364, 421 N.Y.S.2d 850, 853 (1979)). In New York, the existence of proba-
ble cause is determined solely by the magistrate. See People v. Abronovitz, 31 N.Y.2d 160,
165, 286 N.E.2d 721, 723, 335 N.Y.S.2d 279, 282 (1972); People v. Williams, 20 N.Y.2d 388,
391, 229 N.E.2d 839, 840, 281 N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 (1967).
' See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSmUTIONAL LAW § 1.6, at 21 (3d ed.
1986). The states are free to interpret state laws and state constitutions as long as they do
not violate principles of federal law. Id. The federal Constitution establishes minimum guar-
antees of rights and the states may grant additional liberties without violating its provisions.
See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW § 5-20, at 300-06 (1978) (state sover-
eignty overview).
4 See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974).
Over the past several years many states have increased the liberties granted to their own
citizens beyond those granted by the federal Constitution. See e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 172
Conn. 615, 648-49, 376 A.2d 359, 374-75 (1977) (education a fundamental right under state
constitution); People v. Clyne, 189 Colo. 412, 413, 541 P.2d 71, 73 (1975) (state constitution
does not allow full search in arrest for traffic violation). It is generally accepted that state
courts have independence on issues of state law. See Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62
(1967). In support of the trend toward expanding individual rights under state constitutions,
Justice Brennan wrote that federalism "must necessarily be furthered significantly when
state courts thrust themselves into a position of prominence in the struggle to protect the
people of our nation from governmental intrusions on their freedoms." Brennan, State Con-
stitutions and the Protections of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977).
Where a sufficient and independent state ground exists, the Supreme Court has refused to
review such cases so as to avoid rendering advisory opinions as well as out of deference to
the independence of state courts. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1983). The
Court, however, will avoid reviewing a decision based on a state constitution only "[i]f the
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chosen, in a number of instances, to provide increased protection
of rights to its citizens under its state constitution. 5 Recently, in
People v. P.J. Video,' the New York Court of Appeals held that
the state constitution provides greater protection than the federal
Constitution against search and seizure of allegedly obscene mater-
ials, and requires a standard of probable cause for issuance of
search warrants in connection with purported obscenity violations.
In P.J. Video, the defendants were charged with six counts of
obscenity in the third degree under Penal Law section 235.05(1).'
A criminal investigator, under the direction of the Erie County
District Attorney's Office, was assigned to review ten video cas-
settes rented from the defendants.9 The investigator viewed the
movies in their entirety and summarized the theme and conduct of
each film in affidavits which were annexed to the application for
state court decision indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide
separate, adequate, and independent grounds .... " Id. at 1041. See also Friesen, Recovering
Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1269, 1318 (1985) (discussion of
problems and benefits of state activism); Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled
Interpretation of the State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REv. 297, 321 (1977) (applauding inde-
pendent state interpretation "as useful source of constitutional interpretation"). Since the
inception of this country, diversity has been a hallmark of the federal and state court sys-
tems. See Pollock, Adequate and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the
Relationship Between State and Federal Courts, 63 Tax. L. REv. 977, 977-78 (1985). This
has had a beneficial effect on the efficiency of the judicial system. See Hart, The Relation-
ship Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 506 (1954).
See infra note 25.
People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 501 N.E.2d 556, 508 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1301 (1987).
See id. at 309, 501 N.E.2d at 564, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
" See id. at 299, 501 N.E.2d at 558, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 909. Section 235.05 of the Penal
Law provides that: "A person is guilty of obscenity in the third degree when, knowing its
content and character, he: 1. Promotes, or possesses with intent to promote, any obscene
material." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.05(1) (McKinney Supp. 1986). The Penal Law defines any
material or performance as obscene if:
(a) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to the prurient interest
in sex, and (b) it depicts or describes in a patently offensive manner, actual or
simulated: -sexual intercourse, sodomy, sexual bestiality, masturbation, sadism,
masochism, excretion, or lewd exhibition of the genitals, and (c) considered as a
whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, and scientific value. Predominant
appeal shall be judged with reference to ordinary adults unless it appears from the
character of the material or the circumstances of its dissemination to be designed
for children or other specially susceptible audience.
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.00(1) (McKinney 1980).
9 People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566, 574, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 1126, 493 N.Y.S.2d
988, 994 (1985) (Jasen, J., dissenting), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986).
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the warrant authorizing the search of the defendants' premises. 10
Upon review by a justice of the Erie County Supreme Court, a
warrant was issued."' In the execution of the warrant, the defend-
ants' premises were searched and copies of the movies named in
the warrant, together with certain other documents, seized as evi-
dence for trial.12 The defendants, in an omnibus motion before the
Depew Village Court, sought suppression of the seized films.13
Granting the motion, the court held that there could be no finding
of probable cause based solely on the police investigator's allega-
tions of obscenity.14 The order of suppression was affirmed by the
County Court, Erie County, which held that the issuing magistrate,
who had not investigated or viewed the films, had improperly re-
lied on the affidavits alone.'5
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a higher standard
was required in the evaluation of a warrant application when such
items as books and films were involved, since their seizure might
constitute a prior restraint based on content.e The court stated
that in applying the fourth amendment to seizure of such items, a
court must act with "scrupulous exactitude."' 7 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the affidavits satisfied the
fourth amendment warrant requirement, and remanded the case to
the Court of Appeals to determine whether article 1, section 12 of
the New York Constitution imposed a higher standard for the issu-
ance of search warrants for allegedly obscene materials."
10 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). In the affidavits, the investigator identified each film by
title and noted the time required to view each film. Id. at 570, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493
N.Y.S.2d at 991. Each affidavit contained between fifteen and twenty typewritten lines
describing the films. Id. at 570, 483 N.E.2d at 1123-24, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991-92.
,1 Id. at 574, 483 N.E.2d at 1126, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 994 (Jasen, J., dissenting). The war-
rant issued by the magistrate specifically named the tapes to be seized and authorized a
search of personal papers or documents that would identify the owner, lessee, or whoever
had control or custody of the premises. Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting).
11 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). The defendants were charged with promoting obscenity in
regard to only five of the ten films named in the warrant. Id. at 575, 483 N.E.2d at 1126, 493
N.Y.S.2d at 994 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
11 Id. (Jasen, J., dissenting). Defense counsel argued that a magistrate must view the
film in question before he may issue a search warrant, a contention later rejected by both
the United States Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals. See P.J. Video, Inc.,
68 N.Y.2d at 317-18, 501 N.E.2d at 570, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 921 (Hancock. J., dissenting).
" See P.J. Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d at 576 n.2, 483 N.E.2d at 1127 n.2, 493 N.Y.S.2d at
995 n.2 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 576, 483 N.E.2d at 1127, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 995 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 569-70, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
" Id. at 570, 483 N.E.2d at 1123, 493 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
18 See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986). The Supreme Court stated
1986]
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On remand, the Court of Appeals reinstated its original affir-
mation of the county court order, holding that the warrant applica-
tion did not support a finding of probable cause under article 1,
section 12 of the state constitution.19 Judge Simons, writing for the
majority, reaffirmed that it is only the magistrate who, from the
information submitted or available to him, can determine probable
cause.20 The court reasserted its earlier view that the materials
seized "presumptively enjoyed First Amendment protection,"'21
which required the magistrate to perform his duty with "scrupu-
lous exactitude. ' ' 22 Judge Simons reasoned that the Supreme
Court's application of the Illinois v. Gates test to an obscenity case
reflected a "dilution of the requirements of judicial supervision in
the warrant process, and ... a departure from prior law."23 The
court emphasized the state's power to interpret article 1, section 12
of the New York State Constitution as requiring more evidence to
establish probable cause than that required under the federal Con-
stitution,24 and noted that the court had not hesitated in the past
"an application for a warrant authorizing the seizure of materials presumptively protected
by the First Amendment should be evaluated under the same standard of probable cause
used to review warrant applications generally." Id. at 1615. The Court contended it has
never held that a higher standard of probable cause is required where the first amendment
is involved. See id. at 1614.
,9 See P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 309, 501 N.E.2d at 564, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 915. Al-
though the court conceded that the affidavits satisfied section 235.00(1)(b) of the Penal Law,
it stated that satisfaction of subsections (a) and (c) had not been established. See id. at 300-
01, 501 N.E.2d at 559, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
20 See id. at 300, 501 N.E.2d at 588, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 909.
21 See id. The first amendment states, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
. . . prohibiting. . . or abridging the freedom of speech, or freedom of the press ... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I. Motion pictures are protected by the first amendment. See Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684, 690 (1959); Joseph Bur-
styn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
22 P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 300, 501 N.E.2d at 558, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 909. The term
"scrupulous exactitude" was first used in Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). See
supra note 17 and accompanying text; infra note 35 and accompanying text.
23 See P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 305, 501 N.E.2d at 562, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 913; Illi-
nois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983). In Gates, the Court developed a new test for the
determination of probable cause in the issuance of warrants based on hearsay, stating that
the issuing magistrate was simply to determine whether, given the circumstances described
in the affidavit before him, there was "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place." Id. at 238. Gates abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli
test, see id. at 238, which was developed in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969),
and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The Aguilar-Spinelli test was developed to verify
the basis of an informant's knowledge and to insure the reliability of the information given.
See Gates, 462 U.S. at 237; P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 301, 501 N.E.2d at 559, 508
N.Y.S.2d at 910.
24 See P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 302, 501 N.E.2d at 559-60, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 910-11.
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to so protect basic constitutional rights.25 Judge Simons com-
mented that the court in this instance was merely upholding the
consistent application of this standard to protect rights of New
York citizens.26
Dissenting, Judge Hancock rejected the court's contention
that it was merely preserving rights protected under the New York
State Constitution, but no longer protected under the federal Con-
stitution.27 The dissent contended that the Supreme Court's refer-
ence to the Gates test had not diluted judicial supervision in the
warrant process and argued that the federal standard for deter-
mining probable cause had not changed.28 Judge Hancock asserted
that the court was applying the higher standard of evaluation for
prior restraint to an area where such a standard was inapplicable.2"
While supporting the court's right to adopt a higher standard of
evaluation in warrant applications for alleged obscenity viola-
tions,30 the dissent could not reconcile the majority view with pre-
vious New York decisions, and argued that the court was adopting
a new standard without specifically enunciating that standard.3 1
Although states may interpret their own constitutions to pro-
vide broader rights and liberties than those afforded by the federal
See also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
25 See P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 303-05, 501 N.E.2d at 561-62, 508 N.Y.S. at 912-
13. See also People v. Class, 67 N.Y.2d 431, 433, 494 N.E.2d 444, 445, 503 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314
(1986) (officer's nonconsensual entry into automobile violates state constitution); People v.
Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 407, 488 N.E.2d 439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 624 (1985) (standard to
judge police conduct is state constitution, rejecting Gates test); People v. Bigelow, 66
N.Y.2d 417, 427, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 637 (1985) (refusing to accept the
Supreme Court's "good faith exception" on state constitutional grounds).
2 See P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 307, 501 N.E.2d at 563, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
27 See id. at 311, 501 N.E.2d at 566, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 917 (Hancock, J., dissenting). The
dissent argued that the majority was creating more stringent requirements for the seizure of
materials as evidence in obscenity cases. See id. (Hancock, J., dissenting).
28 See id. at 318-19, 501 N.E.2d at 571, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 922 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
The dissent contended that, although the Supreme Court had made reference to the Gates
test, the Court was actually applying the established rule in assessing the adequacy of a
warrant application. See id. (Hancock, J., dissenting). Judge Hancock noted that, since the
Gates test applied to hearsay only, it was not applicable in the instant case. Id. (Hancock,
J., dissenting).
ID See id. at 312, 501 N.E.2d at 566-67, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 918 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
Prior restraint is defined as "an infringement upon constitutional right to disseminate mat-
ters that are ordinarily protected by the First Amendment without there first being a judi-
cial determination that the material does not qualify for First Amendment protection."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1075 (5th ed. 1979).
30 See P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 309, 501 N.E.2d at 565, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 916 (Han-
cock, J., dissenting).
1, See id. at 314, 501 N.E.2d at 568, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 919 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
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Constitution, it is submitted that, by requiring the elements of the
Penal Law to be detailed specifically in the warrant application,
the court in P.J. Video provides no guidance to either law enforce-
ment or judicial personnel in an area of the law based on subjec-
tive judicial decision.3 2 The court's holding in P.J. Video thereby
adopts a higher standard of review for the issuance of search war-
rants authorizing the seizure of allegedly obscene materials.33 As a
result, although it is not required that the magistrate view the film
prior to issuing a warrant, the court, by requiring the affiant to
supply highly detailed factual information, may have made such
review necessary.3 4 It is suggested that the court's application of
"scrupulous exactitude" to materials afforded first amendment
protection is misguided in this case. 5 It is established that when
there has been no prior restraint and the materials sought are to
2 Courts and legislatures have been unable to fashion a satisfactory definition of ob-
scenity. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart noted the difficulty of defining obscenity, and concluded "I know it when I see it."
See id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
" See P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 307, 501 N.E.2d at 563, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
' See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973). There is no absolute right to a prior
adversary hearing where allegedly obscene material is seized. Id. at 488; People v. P.J.
Video, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 566, 571, 483 N.E.2d 1120, 1124, 493 N.Y.S.2d 988, 992 (1985), rev'd,
106 S. Ct. 1610 (1986). It is suggested the standard adopted by the court in P.J. Video will
further slow the judicial process as well as intimidate law enforcement officials in the prose-
cution of individuals allegedly distributing obscene materials. The court's claim that it is
adhering to its established "clear and definable standard of review" developed in People v.
Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549, 330 N.E.2d 631, 369 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1975), is not supported by the
language of Hanlon. Hanlon stated that, when determining the existence of probable cause,
"search warrant applications should not be read in a hypertechnical manner ... [but rather]
... must be considered in the clear light of everyday experience and accorded all reasonable
inferences." Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d at 559, 330 N.E.2d at 637, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
Furthermore, the New York Court of Appeals has never before required such a high
degree of specificity for affidavits in support of search warrant applications to seize allegedly
obscene materials. See People v. Potwora, 48 N.Y.2d 91, 397 N.E.2d 361, 421 N.Y.S.2d 850
(1979); People v. Abronovitz, 31 N.Y.2d 160, 286 N.E.2d 721, 335 N.Y.S.2d 279 (1972); Peo-
ple v. Rothenberg, 20 N.Y.2d 35, 228 N.E.2d 379, 281 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1967).
11 Cf. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). In Stanford, law enforcement officers
searched the defendant's premises under a search warrant authorizing the seizure of Com-
munist literatuie and materials. See id. at 478. The Court held the language of the warrant
to be too broad, stating that "the constitutional requirement that warrants must particu-
larly describe the 'things to be seized' is to be accorded the most scrupulous exactitude
when the 'things' are books ... ." Id. at 485 (emphasis added). It is suggested that the
Stanford Court was expressing its distaste for general warrants, and thus requiring that, if
the material to be seized is protected by the first amendment, the warrant must be exact in
its description. The Court of Appeals, therefore, misconstrued Stanford when stating that
"the magistrate was required to perform his duty with 'scrupulous exactitude.'" P.J. Video,
Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 300, 501 N.E.2d at 558, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
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be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding, a higher standard of
review for the issuance of a warrant is not required.36 Finally, it is
suggested that the Supreme Court's reference to the Gates test
does not lend support to the majority's view that the Supreme
Court was reducing the required level of scrutiny in the warrant
process, or applying anything other than the established rule in
determining probable cause. '
Edwin G. Oswald
CIVIL PRACTICE LAW AND RULES
CPLR 13-A: A district attorney may attach the personal assets of
a defendant, prior to conviction, without establishing that the at-
tached assets are the proceeds of a crime
Article 13-A of the CPLR was designed to "take the profit out
of crime."' The article provides for a civil forfeiture action2 by a
36 See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 491 (1973). In Heller, the Supreme Court held
that the film in question was not subject to a prior restraint, as there was no threat of
destruction, and the warrant was issued by a neutral magistrate; therefore, the seizure as
evidence was permissible. See id. at 492. It is suggested that, although P.J. Video is not a
prior restraint case, the Court of Appeals has improperly applied the Supreme Court's anal-
ysis for prior restraint cases to it.
37 See New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 106 S. Ct. at 1615 n.6. The Gates test is in fact not
applicable to P.J. Video where no informant is involved, inasmuch as such an informant is a
necessary factor in the Gates analysis. See P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d at 318-19, 501 N.E.2d
at 571, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
1 Governor's Memorandum on Approval of ch. 669, N.Y. Laws (Aug. 1, 1984), reprinted
in [1984] N.Y. Laws 3627 (McKinney). On approving article 13-A, Governor Cuomo stressed
the importance of the bill as a weapon "against illicit drug trafficking, and other forms of
organized crime." Id. at 3628. Article 13-A, which took effect August 1, 1984, repealed and
replaced the prior article 13-A, which had been enacted the preceeding year. See CPLR
1310-52 (McKinney Supp. 1987). The new article contains more detailed provisions on bur-
den of proof, presumptions, and the claims of third parties to property associated with the
commission of a crime. See Girese, Forfeiture: A New, Comprehensive Legislative Tool in
War Against Crime, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 25, 1985, at 17, col. 1, col. 2.
2 See CPLR 1311(1) (McKinney Supp. 1987). This section provides that "[a]ny action
under this article.., shall be civil, remedial and in personam in nature and shall not be
deemed a penalty or criminal forfeiture for any purpose." Id. By labeling the action "civil,"
the Legislature has made available other elements of the CPLR, such as provisional reme-
dies, which may be unavailable in a criminal prosecution. See CPLR 1350 (McKinney Supp.
1987).
A forfeiture action which is interpreted as criminal may run afoul of the double jeop-
ardy clause. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; see also Note, A Definition of Punishment for Im-
